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Abstract
We use firm-level data to investigate the impact of taxes on the international lo-
cation of targets in M&A allowing for heterogeneous responses by companies. The
statutory tax rate in the target country is found to have a negative impact on the prob-
ability of an acquisition in that country. In addition, the estimated size of the effect
is found to depend on whether (i) acquirer is a domestic or a multinational enterprise;
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1 Introduction
The growth of international cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) over the last two
decades is well documented. The UNCTAD 2015 World Investment Report states that glob-
ally, the total value of cross-border M&A sales, at 2014 prices, rose from around $98 billion
in 1990 to $399 billion in 2014. This was not a steady increase: during that period there
were two major waves, peaking at $960 million in 2000 and just over $1 trillion in 2007 prior
to the financial crises of 2008, when it dipped to $288 billion in 2009. The importance of
cross-border M&A can be seen in the context of total M&A, and in the context of total
cross-border investment. Erel et al. (2012) report that the percentage of all M&A accounted
for by cross-border deals rose from 23% in 1998 to 45% in 2007. And, according to UNCTAD
FDI data, the percentage of all foreign direct investment that took the form of cross-border
mergers and acquisitions rose from 29% in 1991 to over 48% by 2007. Following the financial
crash, it has since declined to 26% in 2009, but in several recent years the proportion has
been well in excess of 50%.1
This paper examines primarily the impact of corporate taxation on the choice of the
location of a target company by a potential acquirer, controlling for other determinants of
this choice.2 There is a very large literature on the impact of taxes on FDI. Surveys and
meta-analyses include de Mooij and Ederveen (2008) and Feld and Heckemeyer (2011). This
literature finds a substantial impact of taxation. For example, the meta analysis of Feld and
Heckemeyer concludes that the semi-elasticity of FDI with respect to the tax rate is around
-2.5. They also consider how this estimate depends on various factors, such as the type of
FDI and the measure of the tax rate, which we discuss further below. But very little of
this literature has considered the impact of taxation on the location of targets of M&A as
opposed to cross-border greenfield investment. Other literature that does focus on cross-
border M&A sometimes controls for differences in taxation, but this literature pays little
1A useful description of the pattern of cross-border M&A activity is provided by Brakman et al. (2007)
2Liberini (2014) analyses the effect of home country statutory corporate taxes on the headquarter’s decision
to expand its extensive margins and diversify into foreign markets.
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attention to tax. None of the existing literature explores possible heterogeneous effects of the
taxes on the location choice. We provide a conceptual framework to show that the effects of
taxes on the location of targets can be heterogenous, depending on the characteristics of the
acquirer, target and acquisition. We derive testable predictions which we take to the data.
The econometric model we use allows for these heterogeneous effects.
The literature on tax and greenfield FDI has shown that the appropriate measure of an
effective tax rate depends on the choice being made.3 In a model in which capital flows
between locations to equalize post-tax rates of return, then in principle FDI flows depend
on the effective marginal tax rate. In a model considering the extensive margin in which
a company makes a discrete choice between alternative locations, then the choice should
depend on an effective average tax rate. However, there has been no comparable analysis of
the appropriate measurement of effective tax rates in the case of cross-border M&A. We show
that the role of taxes on profits, and hence the probability of choosing a particular target,
is not straightforward; in particular, different reasons for the acquisition may imply that
different elements of the tax system, and hence measures of effective tax rates, are relevant.
A starting point for our conceptual analysis is that M&A will only occur if it is expected
that some surplus is generated. If that surplus is captured wholly by the shareholders of
the acquired company, then the acquirer is imply making a zero net present value (NPV)
investment. Any difference in tax between possible target locations would be capitalized into
the purchase price to keep the NPV equal to zero, but differences in taxes would not affect
the choice of target. For tax to affect the choice of target it is therefore necessary for the
acquirer to capture at least part of the surplus generated. Assuming this, suppose that the
acquirer is able to increase the revenue stream of the target, through improved efficiency,
greater knowledge or perhaps simply use of a brand name. The value of the revenue stream
is reduced proportionately to the host country statutory tax rate, and so a higher statutory
3See Devereux and Griffith (1998) and Devereux and Griffith (2003) for earlier analyses of these issues
with respect to greenfield investment. Recent studies which try to define the effective tax rate (ETR), use
assumptions regarding how the parent and the host country tax rates interact with each other. For example,
Barrios et al. (2012) as well as Huizinga and Voget (2009), construct an ETR based on the subsidiary’s
pre-tax income which is obviously endogenous since this depends on the actual location choice.
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rate would tend to reduce the probability of a particular target being chosen.4
However, this effect depends on the tax system in the country of the acquirer. Where that
country taxes worldwide profit, with a credit for host country taxation, then the effect of host
country taxation may be diminished. This element of the international tax regime was the
primary focus of the analysis by Huizinga and Voget (2009) who investigated, in the context
of cross-border mergers, which of the two companies involved in a merger became the new
parent company. For example, they cite the case of the merger which led to a multinational
firm with a parent (Daimler) located in Germany and a subsidiary (Chrysler) in the US as
resulting to a large extent from Germany exempting foreign source dividend income while
the US taxed such income (net of a foreign tax credit).
We also consider other aspects of the tax regime. For example, in considering the case
in which the acquirer may seek to shift production to a lower cost environment, the rate of
capital allowance in both countries may be a factor in the choice. This consideration moves
the analysis much closer to the conventional treatment of taxation in the case of cross-border
greenfield investment. In the context of a cross-border acquisition, however, this effect is likely
to be secondary, unless the acquirer intends to undertake significant new capital expenditure
in the target, post-acquisition. An alternative may also be possible: that the acquirer can
generate a surplus by cutting costs in the target. In this case, more generous treatment of
those costs in the host country tax system would reduce the gain from cutting costs.
In order to allow for heterogeneous effect of taxes, we use a form of the random parameters
mixed logit model, which avoids making the assumption of the independence of irrelevant
alternatives (IIA) inherent in a standard multinomial logit model - that is, that the ratio of
two choice probabilities is independent of the other alternatives in the choice set. The closest
approach to this in the existing literature is Bertrand and Mucchielli (2007) who estimate
a conditional logit model over 400 European cross-border acquisitions in the 1990s, and
4However, it may also be the case that the acquisition takes place for strategic reasons, with the acquirer
intending to close down the activities of the target to reduce competition (see, for example, Neary (2007)).
In this case, a higher tax rate would reduce the value and hence the price of the target, making it more
attractive for the acquirer. We discuss these and other possible cases below.
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include tax amongst the explanatory variables. However, their approach does require the IIA
assumption. We find that our data do not support this assumption, and therefore estimate
the more general random parameters model which enables us to allow for heterogeneity of
effects of taxes on location choices.
Other approaches in the literature that have considered the impact of taxation on the
location of M&A have primarily used aggregate data. For example, Di Giovanni (2005) and
Coeurdacier et al. (2009) examine the determinants of aggregate M&A flows between bilateral
pairs of countries, using data from 1990-1999 and 1985-2004, respectively. Di Giovanni finds
that the size of domestic financial markets has a strong positive association with domestic
firms investing abroad, while Coeurdacier et al. find significant effects of membership of
the EMU and the EU. Both papers also find a significantly negative impact of corporate
taxation in the country of the acquired company. Erel et al. (2012) explore the proportion
of the total number of M&A deals that are cross-border, but do not focus on the location
of the target. Hebous et al. (2011) do set out to consider the impact of tax on greenfield
FDI and cross-border M&A separately, using data on German parent companies However,
they use a logit model, identifying separately for each possible location whether M&A takes
place, rather than directly examining the choice between different locations. Unlike almost all
previous empirical work that has allowed for the impact of taxation on the location of M&As,
we treat the choice of where to acquire a target company as being made by the ultimate
parent company, conditional on choosing to make an acquisition.5 Instead of just restricting
our analyses to cross-border acquisition alone by multinational enterprises (MNE), as it is
commonly considered in the literature, we also allow both domestic as well as multinational
enterprises to consider the choice of acquisitions that are either domestic or cross-border (for
example see Barrios et al. (2012) and Herger et al. (2016)).
5Some recent examples from the literature where the main focus is on the effect of taxes but only on cross
border aquisitons are Barrios et al. (2012) and Herger et al. (2016). These also differ substantially from our
focus and analyses in other dimensions. (i) Barrios et al. use data on european companies over the period
1999-2003. The locations of subsidiaries are inferred from ownership patterns in the data. The model used is
conditional logit model that suffers from ‘Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives’ problem. (ii) Herger et al.
look at cross-border acquisitions during 1999-2010 but do not relate it to the parent. Repeated acquisitions
in the same country are also treated independently.
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As well as investigating heterogeneity across parent countries depending on their tax
regimes, we also investigate heterogeneity due to differences in parent company characteris-
tics. It seems plausible that there is some element of fixed costs in undertaking cross-border
investments. Such costs are less significant for larger acquisitions; they may also be smaller
for companies which already have some overseas activities which may already have paid some
or all of such costs. The impact of marginal tax differences between locations may therefore
differ between large and small acquirers, between previously purely domestic acquirers and
companies that are already multinational, and between locations depending on whether the
acquirer already has a presence there. We investigate these sources of heterogeneity.
Of course, in attempting to identify the impact of taxes we need to control for many
other factors that are relevant for domestic and cross-border mergers. Cross border M&As
induced by differences in the valuation of the target and the acquirer has been the focus of
much recent empirical literature. Examples of reasons for differences in valuation explored
include: the imperfect integration of capital markets (Erel et al. (2012)); arbitrage generated
through mispriced securities (Baker et al. (2009))6; weak investor protection and accounting
standards (Erel et al. (2012), Rossi and Volpin (2004)); the size of foreign portfolio ownership
of target companies (Ferreira et al. (2010)); and the quality of the structure of governance
in countries (Ellis et al. (2011), Col and Errunza (2015)). We attempt to control for such
effects in our empirical analysis.
In our empirical work, we combine data from two rich world-wide datasets, ORBIS and
ZEPHYR.7 These datasets provide firm-level accounting information and M&A activities.
The ownership structure in the form of a full list of recorded shareholders in companies is
obtained from ORBIS. We construct a chain of majority-owned subsidiaries for each company,
down to the 10th level of dependency. We merge the M&A activities of these companies
recorded in ZEPHYR with ORBIS dataset to trace the changes to ownership structures from
6This could arise due to overpricing of the acquirer (the “cheap financial capital” hypothesis, similar to
the model of Shleifer and Vishny (2003)) or underpricing of the target (the “cheap assets” hypothesis, similar
to the model of Shleifer and Vishny (1992)).
7These datasets are commercially provided by Bureau van Dijk.
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2005 to the end of 2008. The final dataset contains, for each parent company, a list of
the locations of all majority owned subsidiaries in each year between 2005 and 2008. This
identification of all ownership changes due to M&A deals allows us to look at the location
aspects of all the observed majority-owned acquisitions.8 We have in our sample, parent
companies located in 27 countries (Table 2) observed to make 2,623 M&As in 19 countries.
Among the companies engaged in M&As, only 42% were MNEs. We include the remaining
58% of the corporations that did not have foreign subsidiaries in our model, and all for
domestic and foreign acquisitions by these companies.
In our central approach, we consider only companies that make a single acquisition in the
three year period 2005-8 (87% of the parent companies). However, as a robustness check we
also investigate acquiring companies in more than one location in the period considered. In
general, where a target is acquired by the subsidiary of a multinational company, we identify
the acquirer as being the parent company of the multinational group. Consider for example,
a British subsidiary of a US parent company acquiring a German company. In one sense this
represents a flow of foreign direct investment from the UK to Germany. However, control
of the German company effectively passes to the US parent. It seems reasonable to suppose
that an acquisition of any size would be approved, or more likely be organized, by the parent,
which could be considered to have expanded into a third country, and which would, directly
or indirectly, control the activities of the whole group.
Our results suggest that, the host country tax rate in general has a significant negative ef-
fect on the probability of a company in that country being acquired. However, the size of the
effect differs according to the characteristics of the acquirer and to whether the acquisition is
domestic or cross-border. More specifically, we find that “domestic companies” (companies
that did not previously own any foreign subsidiaries), are unaffected by domestic taxation
when choosing to expand within their country, but are significantly affected by changes in
foreign taxation when choosing between different cross-border locations. By contrast, multi-
8The datasets usually used in anaylsis of M&As do not allow the researchers to identify whether the firms
involved in the M&As already had an ownership or not.
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national companies are sensitive to taxes for both domestic and cross-border acquisitions,
although they are less sensitive to differences in taxation between cross-border locations
than are domestic companies. There is some evidence that the tax effects are particularly
strong for large companies.
We find evidence that the effect of corporate tax of the target’s country plays a much less
significant role, or no role at all, when the rate is below that of the acquirer’s country, and
when the latter operates a worldwide, rather than territorial, tax system. This is consistent
with the acquirer taking into account home country taxation on profits earned in the target.
This element of the tax system has also been found to be important in the location of parent
companies (see Huizinga and Voget (2009), and Voget (2011)), and in the location of new
subsidiaries (Barrios et al. (2012)).
Section 2 presents a conceptual framework to explore the role of taxes. We develop a
number of hypotheses concerning the role of tax in different situations. In the remainder of
the paper, we confront these hypotheses with firm-level data on domestic as well as cross-
border acquisitions. In Section 3, we set out our empirical methodology and describe the
data in more detail. In Section 4 we present our results and conclude in Section 5.
2 The role of tax in the choice of location of targets
There have been many theoretical contributions of the role of M&As in the development
of multinational companies.9 Very broadly, these tend to distinguish two motives: an effi-
ciency motive where gains arise through economies of scale, internal technology transfer or
coordination of decision making, and a strategic motive, where firms seek to enter foreign
economies or to reduce competition within their market. The extent of these motives may
differ between firms, and across countries. For example, the strategic motive depends on
the degree to which the markets in the two countries are integrated. 10 We draw from this
9See, for example, Ferrett (2005), Nocke and Yeaple (2007) and Nocke and Yeaple (2008), Neary (2007)
and Neary (2009), Norback and Persson (2007), Hijzen et al. (2008), Raff et al. (2009), Sta¨hler (2014).
10Greenfield investment has very different strategic implications from acquisition. Host country govern-
ments also sometimes view inbound investment in the form of an acquisition rather differently from inbound
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literature and consider a simple conceptual framework to explore some testable hypotheses
regarding the effects of corporation tax on the choice of a target company by an acquirer.
Acquisitions occur when merging two corporations is expected to increase private value.
There are at least three sets of reasons why expected value may increase, relating to differences
in valuation, improvements in efficiency and restriction of competition. But any real changes
in value must ultimately be reflected in changes in revenue and/or costs; we focus primarily
on effects in the target company, but also consider below the case where costs may be shifted
from acquirer to target post-acquisition. We consider changes in revenue and costs in order
to identify the impact of taxation on the choice of the target company by the acquirer. We
also examine how the impact of tax depends on characteristics of the acquirer and target.
We assume that the acquiring company is resident in country h, and seeks to acquire
a target company in country j. The target may be in a foreign country, j 6= h, or in the
domestic country j = h; in the discussion, we identify the target with its country, so also
use the term ”target j” to indicate a target in country j. In the empirical work below, we
condition on an acquisition taking place. The central question posed here is whether, and
how, the tax system affects the choice of where to acquire a target.
The post-tax surplus captured by the acquirer is given by:
Sj = δj {(1− τhj)∆Yj − (1− θjτhj)∆Cj)− (1− ηhjτhj)Fj} (1)
where δj is the share of the overall surplus generated by the acquisition that is captured by
the acquirer, which depends on the acquirer’s bargaining strength; ∆Yj is the present value of
the increase in income generated in the target, located in country j, after it is acquired; ∆Cj
is the present value of the change in costs in the target, after it is acquired; and Fj is a fixed
cost associated with acquiring the target. Statutory tax rates are τh in the acquirer’s country
and τj in the target’s country. However, the overall tax rate may include both corporation tax
on profit generated in the target, withholding taxes levied in the target country on income
greenfield investment, on the grounds that it primarily constitutes a change of ownership rather than an
addition to the country’s capital stock Dinc and Erel (2013), Bertrand et al. (2012). We do not consider
greenfield investment choices in this study.
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remitted to the acquirer, and any residual tax levied in country h. We denote the overall
tax rate applied to income generated in country j, but accruing to the acquirer in country
h, as τhj. Finally, it is possible that only a proportion of the present value of costs can be
set against tax - for example, capital expenditure is typically depreciated over time, reducing
the present value of deductions. The proportions applied to costs C in country j are θj; ηhj
is the proportion of fixed costs allowable against tax, which depends on the size of allowances
and on the proportion of costs incurred in each country. The acquirer will choose a target in
country k if
Sk > Sj, ∀j 6= k. (2)
Now consider the various factors influencing this choice. First, for given fixed costs, the
higher the acquirer’s bargaining strength, the higher the acquirer’s surplus, Sj. If δk >
δj,∀j 6= k, this would make an acquisition in k more likely, ceteris paribus. However, in an
international market, it is perhaps more likely that bargaining strength would depend only on
characteristics of the acquirer: δj = δ, ∀j. Then if the surplus generated by the acquisition is
as shown in (1), a higher bargaining strength would not affect the choice of target company.
Next, to simplify for the moment, suppose that all costs are immediately deductible from
tax, θj = ηhj = 1 and that δj = δ, ∀j. Then (1) simplifies to
Sj = δ(1− τhj) {∆Yj −∆Cj − Fj} = δ(1− τhj)S∗j . (3)
where S∗j = ∆Yj −∆Cj − Fj , multiplied by δ, is the acquirer’s share of the pre-tax surplus
from the acquisition of target j. In this case, the acquirer will choose a target in country k if
S∗k − S∗j > Z = τhkS∗k − τhjS∗j , ∀j 6= k. (4)
In the absence of tax, then Z = 0 and the acquirer will choose target k if the pre-tax
surplus in k is higher than for any other potential acquisition. In the presence of tax, the
acquirer would choose the target k only if the additional pre-tax surplus in k relative to other
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options is greater than Z - that is, it is sufficient to outweigh any possible tax disadvantage
in k, where the tax disadvantage is measured by Z. Clearly, ∂Z/∂τhk > 0, indicating that
a higher overall tax rate on investment from h to k, τhk, would make it less likely that the
acquirer would choose target k. That is:
Proposition 1. In general, the probability of acquiring a target in a particular country falls
as the overall tax rate for an acquisition in that country rises.
This is the central proposition tested in this paper. However, we expect considerable
heterogeneity in responses to taxation, which we now examine.
First, the relative pre-tax surplus S∗k − S∗j ,∀j 6= k may depend on firm and country char-
acteristics as costs may differ markedly both between acquirers and locations. For example,
undertaking an acquisition in a country new to an acquirer may incur greater fixed costs.
This example would include any purely domestic company seeking to acquire abroad for the
first time, implying that the surplus from acquiring a domestic target (in this case, country k)
could be much higher than the surplus from acquiring a foreign target. Consequently, in this
case, the choice of target may be less sensitive to differences in taxation between locations.
Another example may be very large companies, for whom fixed costs are relatively small, and
who are able to collect detailed information from a greater range of the available options.
Both of these factors may imply that differences in pre-tax surpluses between possible targets
are smaller for such companies, and hence they may be more sensitive to tax.
Proposition 2. In general, the choice of a target will be less sensitive to taxation when
differences in the pre-tax surplus between locations are greater.
We investigate Proposition 2 by allowing the impact of taxation to differ between: (a)
acquirers that are domestic or multinational prior to the acquisition; (b) small and large
acquirers; (c) domestic and foreign acquisitions; and (d) acquisitions in countries where the
acquirer already has a presence and those in which it does not.
Second, the impact of taxation on the choice of target may also be lower if the acquirer is
a multinational company with the experience and capability of shifting taxable profit to low
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tax jurisdictions to reduce its overall tax liability.11 Suppose for example, that the acquirer
is able to shift a proportion ψ of its taxable profit in any jurisdiction to a tax haven, and so
escape tax on that proportion of its profit. Then the condition for choosing target k becomes:
S∗k − S∗j > ZPS = (1− ψ)(τhkS∗k − τhjS∗j ), ∀j 6= k. (5)
Clearly ∂ZPS/∂ψ < 0, and so a rise in the proportion of taxable profit shifted makes
it less likely that a higher tax rate in country k will cause the acquirer to instead choose
a target in another country. Further any impact of a rise in the tax rate in k will have a
smaller impact on the probability of the acquirer choosing k, since ∂2Z/∂τhk∂ψ < 0. This
is intuitive: tax is less likely to affect the choice of the location of the target company when
the acquirer has more opportunities to avoid taxes.
Proposition 3. The impact of the statutory tax rate in the country of the target is weaker
when the acquirer is more able to shift income to low-tax jurisdictions.
In our empirical work, we investigate this proposition by allowing the effects of taxation to
depend on two factors, which may reflect the ability to shift profit: (a) whether or not a
company is a multinational prior to the acquisition, and (b) the size of the acquirer.
Third, the impact of the statutory tax rate in the country of the target may depend on the
tax system in the country of the acquirer. In the simplest case, in which the home country h
does not tax income generated in country k, then τhk = τk and hence ∂τhk/∂τk = 1. However,
suppose country h seeks to tax worldwide income, with a credit for any tax paid in k (as
remains the cases in the USA, and was the case in the UK until 2009). If country k is the
home country (h = k) then τhk = τk since there is no additional tax on dividends paid within
the home country. But if k is a foreign country, then in the extreme case in which there is no
deferral of the repatriation of profit, then τhk = max{τh, τk}. In this extreme case, if τh > τk,
11See Dharmapala (2014) for a recent review of the vast literature on the effect of taxes on profit shifting.
For empirical evidence on this topic, see Egger et al. (2010) and Egger et al. (2014), who use German data.
Dharmapala and Riedel (2013), who trace the effect of positive earnings shocks at the parent level on the
profit of low-tax subsidiaries.
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then ∂τhk/∂τk = 0: a marginal rise in the tax rate in k would have no effect on the cut-off
value τhk. In practice, country h tax can be deferred until the profit is repatriated, and hence
the present value of the country h tax is reduced. But as long as there is still some residual
country h tax, then ∂τhk/∂τk < 1. That is, the sensitivity of the overall tax rate to changes
in the statutory tax rate in country k is lower, and a rise in the statutory rate in k is less
likely to move the overall tax rate across the cut-off threshold, τ ∗hk. In sum:
Proposition 4. The impact of the statutory tax rate in the country of the target is weaker
when the country of the acquirer taxes the worldwide income of its resident companies with a
credit for tax paid abroad, and the tax rate in the country of the target is lower than the tax
rate in the country of the acquirer.
In our empirical work, we investigate this proposition by allowing the effects of taxation to
be different in the case described in this proposition.
Next, we return to the more general formulation of the surplus in (1), which allows for
costs not to be fully deductible. To focus only on the role of costs and tax deductions for
costs, assume that ∆Yj = Fj = 0. Then the acquirer would choose target k if
∆Cj −∆Ck > ZC = θjτhj∆Cj − θkτhk∆Ck, ∀j 6= k. (6)
The impact of the permitted rate of deduction in country j, θj, depends on whether the
target’s production costs rise or fall after the acquisition. Both are possible in principle. One
way of generating a surplus would be to cut costs in the target country, ∆Ck < 0, while
maintaining output and revenue. In the absence of tax, the acquirer would choose target k
if costs could be reduced more in k, that is, ∆Cj − ∆Ck > 0. With tax, this difference in
pre-tax costs must again be compared to any tax disadvantage from choosing k, in this case
reflected in the relative generosity of allowances measured by θ. For the case of a reduction
in costs in the target, ∆Ck < 0, then ∂Z
C/∂θk > 0.That is, higher allowances in k reduce
the cost advantage from choosing k, and hence reduce the probability of choosing k. That is:
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Proposition 5. If the acquirer intends to reduce costs in the target, then a higher rate of
tax allowance in a country will reduce the probability that a target will be acquired in that
country.
By contrast, suppose that the acquirer plans to shift production from home to the new
target company. Assume for simplicity that the reduction of costs at home is the same for all
potential targets. But now costs will rise in the target company. Expression (6 ) still holds,
but now ∆Cj > 0,∀j. In this case, ∂ZC/∂θk < 0.That is, higher allowances in k increase the
advantage from choosing k, and hence increase the probability of choosing k. That is:
Proposition 6. If the acquirer intends to increase production to the target, then a higher
rate of tax allowance in a country will increase the probability that a target will be acquired
in that country.
The difference in the effect of tax allowances reflects the difference in how the cost saving is
assumed to take place. In Proposition 5, it takes place in the country of the target, and the
value of the saving is reduced by the tax allowance. In proposition 6, it takes place in the
home country. The saving is then reduced by the value of the foregone tax allowance in the
home country, at the cost of higher expenditure in the foreign country. In order to investigate
propositions 5 and 6, in our empirical work, we examine the impact of (i) the effective average
tax rate (EATR); (ii) a variable measuring the generosity of capital allowances in the host
country.
3 Empirical Approach
3.1 Methodology
Our econometric model is informed by our discussions in Section 2. In particular, the dis-
cussions showed that the sign of the effect of host country taxes can either be positive or
negative dpending on the economic objecties of the company. To capture this, we allow each
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parent company to have a different tax effect with the mean effect dependent on company
characteristics.
An acquiring company indexed by i in our model, is assumed to acquire a target in a
country j which provides the largest expected surplus over all countries, where the latent
surplus associated with the target in country j is given by
Sij = β
′
jzi + γτj + αi + εij (7)
zi is a vector of choice invariant (company) characteristics that are allowed to have effects
that are choice specific which will also include parent country taxes and other base year
characteristics of the company. αi is an unobservable company specific heterogeneity term
that may be correlated with included regressors. Since our model conditions on acquisition,
we can think of this term αi as capturing company specific selection effects. For ease of
exposition, we assume that there is only one alternative specific variable τ , say the target
country specific tax rate. In the estimated model we include other host country variables - see
sub-section 3.2. We allow the parameter γ to be randomly distributed across the companies
but the mean effect to be dependent on some observable characteristics of the parent. That
is, we assume that every company in our sample has its own γ which is known to the company
but unknown to the econometrician, and write this as
γi = γ
′
0wi + σui where ui ∼ iidN(0, 1) (8)
i.e. γi ∼ iidN(γ′0wi, σ2). wi are company specific variables that are assumed to shift the mean
effect of γi. This model collapses to the standard multinomial choice model when σ = 0.
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Substituting (8) into (7) gives
Sij = β
′
jzi + (γ
′
0wi + σui)τj + αi + εij = β
′
jzi + (γ
′
0wi)τj + αi + (στjui + εij) (9)
12It is customary to call the fixed coefficient logit model, a multinomial logit model when all the variables
are choice invariant and a conditional logit model when all the variables are choice specific. However, there
is no reason why one cannot have both types of variables in the model as we have. For ease of exposition,
we describe the model as a multinomial model when the coefficients are not random.
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The company specific error term στjui also induces correlation between alternatives which is
not present in the standard multinomial choice model, and which relaxes the IIA assumption.
Also note that the new additional error term is now heteroskedastic due to the presence of
τj. Under the assumption that εij is iid Gumbel, the conditional probability (conditioned on
γi) that alternative j is chosen will be of the form of the multinomial logit probability,
13
Prob(yij = 1|γi) =
exp
(
β
′
jzi + γiτj
)∑
l exp
(
β
′
lzi + γiτl
)
where yij is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if company i chooses alternative
j.14 The new composite error term vij = στjui + εij will be a mixture of normal and Gumbel
distributions. Since γi is not known, we have to integrate out the u from the conditional
choice probabilities to obtain the unconditional choice probabilities,
pij = Prob(j is chosen) = Prob(yij = 1) =
∫
exp
(
β
′
jzi + (γ
′
0wi)τj + στjui
)∑
l exp
(
β
′
lzi + (γ
′
0wi)τl + στlui
)φ(u)du (10)
where φ denotes the standard Normal density. The log likelihood will consist of terms like in
(10). The model is estimated using simulated maximum likelihood using the fact that (10)
is a calculation of an expected value. We replace the integral by a sample average of the
function constructed by drawing enough observations from φ(u) to calculate this average. It
can be shown that this sample average consistently estimates the choice probabilities given
by (10). In our simulations we use 50 Halton draws.15
Relative to a standard multinomial logit model, because of the correlation between alter-
13For notational ease, we do not explicitly state that the probability statements are all conditioned on the
observed data.
14(9) collapses to the error components multinomial logit model when we allow for a company specific
random intercept. Also note, all company specific covariates that have constant effects across choices including
the company specific unobservables αi, drop out of the equation.
15Although there are different ways of drawing random numbers from a particular distribution, the Halton
draws have been proven to be very effective Train (2009). The results were very similar with 50 and 100
draws.
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natives, this allows us to model (i) random variations in the response probability to changes
in variables, (ii) unrestricted substitution patterns, and (iii) correlated unobserved factors
Train (2009).16
It is common to estimate these choice probabilities as conditional logit models (recent
papers include, Barrios et al (2012), Herger et al (2016)) where it is assumed that the effects
of z variables are the same across alternatives. Hence parent country taxes can only be
brought into the model when they are interacted with alternative specific variables such as
the taxes in the host country. We do not do this as our theoretical discussions shows that the
relevant tax variables are the satutory variables. This also allows us to separately identify
the effects of different taxes on choice probabilities.
3.2 Data
Main data for the analysis come from the 2005 file of ORBIS compiled by the Bureau van Dijk
(BvD).17 This commercial world-wide dataset provides firm-level accounting information on
companies, including ownership structure in the form of a full list of recorded shareholders
in these companies. We use this to construct a chain of majority-owned subsidiaries for each
company, down to the 10th level of dependency. The M&A activities recorded in another
commercially available dataset ZEPHYR (BvD), were then merged with the original data
from ORBIS to trace the changes in the firms’ ownership structure from 2005 to the end of
2008. The final dataset contains, for each parent company, a list of location of all majority
owned subsidiaries in each year between 2005 and 2008. This identification of all ownership
changes due to M&A deals allows us to look at the location aspects of all the observed
majority-owned acquisitions.
Our analysis is based on a cross-section sample of parent companies not defined as ‘micro’
by the European Commission (2003) in 2005.18 From this sample, we selected those parent
16The model parameters are estimated in NLOGIT 4 (NLOGIT, 2007) using simulated maximum likeli-
hood.
17The year 2005 refers to the period 1st April 2005 to 31st March 2006.
18Selecting non-micro companies involved selecting only companies with at least two subsequent years of
recorded total assets greater than e2,000 and at least one employee.
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companies that made at least one acquisition during the three year period 2006 to 2008
regardless of whether they already had a presence in the new country or not. The ultimate
parent of the group is treated as being responsible for the expansions directly made and for
those undertaken by its majority owned subsidiaries.
The final sample consists of 2,623 parent companies residing in 47 countries. We used
ownership information from the original full set of data to identify companies in the same
group in our sample. Based on the information in our base year of 2005, companies were
classified as: (i) belonging to a multinational group if they were connected by an ownership
link of at least 50 per cent of the capital to at least one other company located in a different
country ; (ii) belonging to a domestic group if they were connected by an ownership link of
at least 50 per cent to other companies, all located in the same country as the parent; or (iii)
as a stand-alone company if it did not have any such ownership links with other companies.
The main dependent variable of interest in our model is the choice of a location country
during the period 2005-08. If a parent acquires more than one target in a single country in
the same year, this parent is recorded as having made one location choice. In that sense, we
use the word ‘acquisition’ to mean a location choice. Some characteristics of the nature of the
companies in the dataset are provided in Table 1. Multinationals and domestic groups equally
dominate the sample of companies that are engaged in acquisitions during our sample period
with only about 15% of acquisitions undertaken by stand-alone companies. The number of
companies changing their organizational structure and expanding into a new location equals
40% of the total sample. Most parent companies, exactly 2,282, make only one expansion
over the sample period. Considering also the parent companies making multiple acquisitions,
we observe a total of 3,051 completed expansions.
We define the target location choice set to preserve reasonable cell sizes for the statistical
analysis; specifically we consider only those alternatives that have been chosen by at least
15 different parent companies. This yields us a choice set with eighteen possible countries.
Since 59% of the observed expansions were in the same country as the parent, we also add
an alternative ‘domestic’ to the choice set. If the parent company is located in one of the 18
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countries, it will have a reduced choice set of 17 alternatives plus the “domestic” option.
The geographical distribution of our parent companies is provided in Table 2. The UK is
residence to the largest number of companies undertaking an acquisition, with 674 companies,
followed by the USA with 261 and France with 205. Table 3 reports the frequency with which
the target locations were chosen by this sample of parents. The United States appears to
have the largest number of targets of cross-border acquisitions, and the United Kingdom the
largest number of domestic acquisitions.19
3.3 Variables
We use a number of variables informed by previous literature and the theoretical section to
examine the determinants of M&A activity. We use three different measures of the corpora-
tion tax system in each country: (i) the statutory tax rate is the headline corporation tax
rate in the country, including typical local tax rates; (ii) the measure of allowances reflects
the present value of allowances for a unit of new investment, based on a range of different
assets; (iii) the effective average tax rate (EATR) broadly measures the proportion of the
net present value of an investment taken in tax. The measure of allowances and the EATR
are based on the methodology set out in Devereux and Griffith (2003). In addition, we also
include parent country statutory corporate income tax and allow the effect of this to vary
across choices. However, we do not discuss the effects of this variable to preserve space (the
results are available on request).
Clearly we need to control for non-tax factors that affect acquisition location decisions.
Informed by the literature discussed above, we include a number of control variables from
various sources: the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) database, the GeoDist
database (Mayer and Zignago (2011)) from Porta et al. (2008) (see Appendix B). Descriptive
statistics for each variable for each of 18 potential target countries are provided in Table 4.
19As a robustness check in Table 6, column 4, we include only acquisitions from acquirers in countries that
have at least 10 acquiring companies.
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4 Results
We first present the results from our base model estimation in Table 5. In Column 1 we begin
with the model with fixed coefficients, a standard multinomial logit (MNL) model (see foot-
note 14). As discussed above, we distinguish between the alternatives of domestic expansion
from that of a cross-border expansion, allowing the effect of tax to be different across these
two sets of alternatives. To allow for the possibility that multinational enterprises (MNEs)
might be in a better position to avoid taxes by shifting income to lower-tax jurisdiction (see
Proposition 3), we also allow the impact of taxes to be different between MNEs and domestic
companies in all our model specifications. This is done by including an interaction between
tax variable and a binary indicator variable for whether the acquirer was a multinational en-
terprise already before 2005 (indicated by “MNE”). This means that we estimate 4 separate
coefficients on the tax variable. We include the 13 choice-specific control variables described
above in all specifications. The ‘distance’ measures are only allowed to affect the cross-border
choices. In addition, in all specifications we include choice specific intercepts, and the parent
country tax rate, the coefficient of which is permitted to vary across the choices as shown in
(9). We report the coefficients of the choice-specific control variables, but in order to keep
the presentation manageable, we do not report the choice-specific intercepts or coefficients
of the parent country tax rate.
Several of the control variables are significant in all of the specifications in Table 5. The
size of the economy, measured by GDP, has a significant positive effect on the probability
of acquiring a target in a given country. Also, as expected, targets are more likely to be in
countries that are contiguous with the country of the acquirer, that share a common language
and a legal system and are closer to each other. The cost of business start-ups has a negative
effect on the probability of choosing a particular location, and in some specifications, greater
disclosure also has a negative effect. These variables may proxy for a number of aspects of
the regulatory framework in the choice country. The size of private credit also has a negative
effect. This may reflect a substitution effect: companies may be more prone to being acquired
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by a foreign company, if located in countries where the supply of credit, and so the possibility
of internal expansion, is restricted. Conditional on these effects, unemployment has a positive
effect, which may reflect the relative availability of workers.
The main tax variable used in Table 5 is the statutory tax rate in the target country.20 In
Column 1 the coefficient on this variable is significant only for the domestic tax rate affecting
the domestic expansion choice of a multinational. This result is surprising, but it is not
robust to varying the model specification.
In Column 2 we present the results from the random parameters (RP) logit model, in
which every parent company in our sample has its own tax coefficient for the cross-border
choice, and we assume them to be drawn from a normal distribution. Allowing also for
a random tax effect for the domestic expansion choice did not produce results different
to those where only the cross-border expansion choice tax effect is random. We therefore
present results in which the tax effects are random only for the cross-border expansions.
Including this random component has an important effect on the estimated coefficients –
those presented in the table should be interpreted as a mean effect. The effect of tax on
the domestic choice remains similar to the previous specification. But now the tax rate on
cross-border acquisitions also becomes significant. Specifically, the first line, which can be
interpreted as the effect for acquirers that were purely domestic in 2005, has a negative and
highly significant effect. The positive and significant coefficient reported in the second line
indicates that multinational companies respond less in cross-border expansion than domestic
companies to differences between the tax rates in foreign countries. The maximised value
of the log likelihood is much higher in the RP model. In addition, the estimated standard
deviation of the random parameters (RP) term is also highly significant. These indicate
that this random components model should be preferred over the previous specifications.
We therefore use Column 2 as a base for exploring various other forms of heterogeneity in
responses to taxation in the remainder of the Table.
20As discussed before, all models reported include parent country taxes with effects varying across the
choice of countries. These are available on request from the authors.
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Prior to discussing the rest of the columns in this table, we comment on the different
effects of the tax rate for the different types of company, and for the different options in
Column 2, and relate the results to the predictions in Propositions 1, 2 and 3. Consistent
with Proposition 1, we find a negative effect of the tax rate in the country of the target
for all cross-border acquisitions and for domestic acquisitions for multinational companies.
Consistent with Proposition 2, higher fixed costs associated with all outbound acquisitions
for domestic companies mean that the choice between outbound locations is not sensitive to
tax for these companies. We further explore aspects of Proposition 2 below. Consistent with
Proposition 3, the results indicate that multinationals are less sensitive to tax in choosing
between cross-border acquisitions, perhaps because multinationals face lower costs in shifting
profit to lower-taxed jurisdictions. This is consistent with the findings from Egger et al.
(2014) that host-country profit taxes have an insignificant effect on companies which are able
to avoid profit taxes.
In Columns 3 and 4 we explore other possible implications of Propositions 2 and 3.
In Column 3, we investigate whether the effects of taxation differ according to the size of
companies, as well as differentiating between multinationals and domestic companies. One
element of the discussion of Proposition 2 is that large multinationals may face smaller
differences in pre-tax surpluses between potential targets - because their fixed costs are
relatively small, and because they may have the resources to investigate alternative options
in more depth (and are hence less likely to miss potential opportunities). Both of these
factors may make larger multinationals more sensitive to differences in taxation. Offsetting
this, larger multinationals may be more able to shift profits to lower-taxed jurisdictions;
which would make them less sensitive to the statutory tax rate in countries of potential
targets. We test these propositions in Column 3. We identify a “large” company as one
that owned at least 4 subsidiaries (domestic or foreign) in 2005. We have experimented by
choosing different numbers of subsidiaries and report the results with the highest maximized
value of the log likelihood. The results of Column 3 are mixed, perhaps reflecting these
conflicting issues. Large multinationals appear to be more sensitive to tax differences than
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small multinationals for the location of both domestic and cross-border expansion. We do
not find any significant differences in the response of large and small domestic acquirers. The
effects for multinationals are consistent with there being smaller differences across potential
targets in their pre-tax surpluses for larger companies, as explored in Proposition 2. It is not
consistent with large multinationals having greater opportunities to avoid tax. It is possible
that such tax avoidance opportunities are better proxied simply by whether a company is a
multinational, rather than by size differences.
In Column 4 we examine whether the effects of taxation depend on whether the acquirer
already has a subsidiary in the target location in 2005. Clearly, for cross-border acquisitions
this can only apply to multinational companies, which are already located outside of the
home country in 2005. We find evidence that there is no significant differential effect between
domestic companies and multinationals in the effects of tax on the choice of acquisitions in
new countries. However, multinationals are less sensitive to tax in countries in which they
already have some presence. These results are consistent with gains from profit shifting by
multinationals being focused primarily in countries in which they already have some presence,
and hence expertise of the tax system.
In Column 5 we explore Proposition 4, which indicates that the effect of a foreign tax rate
may be smaller when the acquirer is resident in a country that taxes worldwide income, with
a credit for foreign taxes paid; this tax is levied where the host country has a lower statutory
tax rate. We investigate this by allowing the coefficient on the host country tax variable to
differ in such circumstances. We find a striking effect for multinational acquirers, though not
for domestic acquirers. For the former, we find a large, positive and significant effect, which
approximately cancels out the other effects applying to multinational companies (in the first
two rows), indicating that in such circumstances the tax rate in the host country effectively
has no effect on the choice of cross-border target. Given the possibilities of international tax
arbitrage, this is a striking result, which is, however, consistent with results in other contexts.
For example, Huizinga and Voget (2009) find that the identity of the parent following a cross-
border merger depends on this effect (indicating that acquirers are less likely to be located
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in the US, for example). Voget (2011) also finds that such taxation in the country of the
parent has a significant impact on relocation of parents.
In Columns 6 and 7, we explore Propositions 5 and 6 which relate to capital expenditure.
These consider the cases where it is intended to increase, or reduce, capital expenditure in
the target post-acquisition. The value of capital allowances should potentially play a role
here: more generous treatment of capital expenditure is beneficial when it is intended to
undertake more expenditure, but less beneficial when it is intended to reduce expenditure.
More generally, previous literature (for example, Devereux and Griffith (1998)) has argued
that the effective average tax rate (EATR) is the relevant measure of taxation for new green-
field investments. To the extent to which it is intended to expand the target company
post-acquisition, then the EATR would be relevant to the choice of target.
Column 6 uses the baseline of Column 2, but replaces the host country statutory tax rate
with the host country Effective Average Tax Rate (EATR), to see whether the EATR is the
more relevant measure. A problem here is that the two measures are highly correlated with
each other, and so it is difficult to determine separate effects of each measure. Including both
tends to raise standard errors, with few of the coefficients remaining significant. Including just
the EATR, as we do in Column 6, indicates that the EATR has a similar effect to the statutory
rate. The most notable difference is that domestic expansion by non-multinational companies
does depend significantly on the EATR. This is consistent with cross-border acquisitions
being seen as an alternative to domestic greenfield expansions through additional capital
expenditure, especially for domestic companies.
Column 7 instead adds to the statutory tax rate a variable measuring the generosity of
capital allowances in the host country, allowing the coefficient to vary according to whether
the acquisition is domestic or cross-border and whether the acquirer is a multinational or
domestic company. The effects of the statutory rates are very similar to previous specifica-
tions. In addition, allowances play a significant and positive role for domestic acquisitions.
This is consistent with the result for the EATR in Column 6, since the EATR is in effect
a non-linear combination of the measure of allowances used in Column 7 and the statutory
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rate. Consistent with Column 6, the more generously domestic capital expenditure is treated
by the tax system, the more likely is the company to choose a domestic acquisition. This is
consistent with acquirers undertaking new capital expenditure, consistent with Propositions
6, rather than cutting such expenditure in the target company.
4.0.1 Robustness analyses
In Table 6 we carry out various tests of the robustness of our results. Column 1 reproduces
the results of Column 2 of Table 5 for ease of comparison. Column 2 of Table 6 investigates
whether the results on the impact of the host country tax rate could be due to correlation
between the tax rate and the control variables. To examine this we drop all the control
variables. The results are very similar, indicating that the inclusion of the control variables
has little impact on our estimated effects of taxation
In Table 5 we restrict our analysis to acquirers that made acquisitions in only one coun-
try during the time period 2005-8. This induces a potential selection bias, since companies
undertaking multiple acquisitions may be more or less responsive to taxation. As a further ro-
bustness check, we take the alternative approach of including all acquisitions in our database.
However, in order to make this feasible, we treat each acquisition as being independent – in
effect treating each of them as if they were being undertaken by a separate company. An
acquirer that has made, say, 3 acquisitions will therefore appear in the data 3 times. Clearly,
this approach also has econometric problems in that we treat the error terms as being in-
dependent. However, the nature of the error is different from our previous approach, and
we can gauge how important these problems are by following both approaches. The results,
shown in Column 3 of Table 6, are broadly similar to the base case. The only significant
difference is that under these circumstances domestic acquirers now appear to be sensitive
to tax rates for domestic acquisitions.
In Column 4 of Table 6 we explore whether there is any significant heterogeneity by the
location of the acquirer. To explore this, we restrict our sample to acquirers incorporated
in countries where we observe at least ten different parent firms, and we revert to using
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companies that make only one acquisition. The left panel of Table 2 provides a list of
all these countries with large population of acquirers. This sample restriction has little
impact on the results; as with Column 3, the only significant difference is that under these
circumstances domestic acquirers appear to be marginally more sensitive to tax rates for
domestic acquisitions.
Finally, we consider the magnitude of the effects of taxes on the location of acquisitions.
Tables 7 and 8 summarise estimated elasticities based on Table 5 columns 1 and 2, respec-
tively. In each case, the diagonal (iith) shows the own-elasticity: the effects of a 1 percent
change in country i′s tax rate on probability that an acquirer will choose a target in this
country i. Note that the acquirer can be from any country. The off-diagonals show the
cross-elasticities: the ijth element shows the effects of a 1 percent change in country i′s tax
rate on probability that an acquirer will choose a target in country j. By construction, for
the standard multinational logit model (Table 7), the off-diagonal elasticities are the same
for each row by assumption; that is, a change in the tax rate in, say, Austria has the same
effect on the probability of a target choice in all other countries. This assumption is relaxed
in Table 8. In both tables, the own-elasticities are generally quite large, and approximately
half of them exceed 1 in absolute terms. This implies that, for a typical country in our
dataset, with a tax rate of around 30%, a reduction to 27%, for example, would increase
the probability that an acquirer chooses that country by more than 10%. Not surprisingly,
the cross-elasticities are much smaller, with the exception of elasticities for the domestic tax
rate, a change in which has relatively large effects on the probability of choosing each other
country.
5 Conclusions
This paper investigates the impact of corporation taxes on the location choice decision of a
parent company. We provide a conceptual framework that identifies heterogeneous effects of
taxation, depending on the characteristics of the acquirer, target and reason for the acquisi-
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tion. We derive testable predictions where we show that, in principle, a higher tax rate in
a country could raise, reduce, or leave unchanged the probability that its corporations are
the subject of a cross-border acquisition. We consider aspects of the tax regime in both the
target’s country and acquirer’s country. We use a mixed logit (random parameter) model to
allow for this heterogeneous response to tax rates.
Our results suggest that the host country tax rate in general has a negative effect on
the probability of a company in that country being acquired. On average, elasticities are
around 1: a 10% reduction in the tax rate of a country would increase the probability of an
acquirer choosing that country, by about 10%. Around half the countries have an estimated
elasticity that exceeds 1 in absolute terms. These estimated elasticities differ according to
the characteristics of the acquirer and whether the acquisition is domestic or cross-border.
More specifically, we find weaker evidence of an effect of taxation on the domestic expansion
choices of domestic companies, although their cross-border choices are sensitive to tax in the
country of the target company. By contrast, multinational companies are sensitive to taxes
for both domestic and cross-border acquisitions, although they are less sensitive to differences
in taxation between cross-border acquisitions than are domestic companies. There is some
evidence that these effects are particularly strong for large companies.
We also present evidence that the host country tax rate does not play a role in the location
decision when the acquirer’s country operates a worldwide tax system with a credit for foreign
taxes, and where the host country tax rate is lower than the home country tax rate. This is
consistent with acquirer taking account of home country taxation on future dividends from
the newly-acquired target company. Finally, we find a significant effect of allowances and the
Effective Average Tax Rate (EATR) on the choice of target location for domestic companies,
which is consistent with cross-border acquisition being seen as an alternative to domestic
greenfield expansion through additional capital expenditure.
27
References
Baker, Malcolm; Foley, C. Fritz, and Wurgler, Jeffrey. Multinationals as Arbitrageurs: The
Effect of Stock Market Valuations on Foreign Direct Investment. Review of Financial
Studies, 22(1):337–369, January 2009.
Barrios, Salvador; Huizinga, Harry; Laeven, Luc, and Nicode`me, Gae¨tan. International
taxation and multinational firm location decisions. Journal of Public Economics, 96(11):
946–958, 2012.
Bertrand, Olivier and Mucchielli, Jean-Louis. Location choices of multinational firms: The
case of mergers and acquisitions. Journal of Economic Integration, 22:181–209, 2007.
Bertrand, Olivier; Hakkala, Katariina Nilsson; Norba¨ck, Pehr-Johan, and Persson, Lars.
Should countries block foreign takeovers of r&d champions and promote greenfield entry?
The Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d’e´conomique, 45(3):1083–1124,
2012.
Brakman, Steven; Garretsen, Harry, and Van Marrewijk, Charles. Cross-border mergers &
acquisitions: The facts as a guide for international economics. International Mergers and
Acquisitions Activity Since 1990, pages 23 – 49, 2007.
Coeurdacier, Nicolas; Santis, Roberto A. De, and Aviat, Antonin. Cross-border mergers and
acquisitions and european integration. Economic Policy, 24:55–106, 01 2009.
Col, Burcin and Errunza, Vihang. Corporate governance and state expropriation risk. Journal
of Corporate Finance, 33:71 – 84, 2015.
de Mooij, Ruud A. and Ederveen, Sjef. Corporate tax elasticities: a reader’s guide to empirical
findings. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 24(4):680–697, 2008.
Devereux, Michael P. and Griffith, Rachel. Taxes and the location of production: evidence
from a panel of us multinationals. Journal of Public Economics, 68(3):335–367, June 1998.
28
Devereux, Michael P. and Griffith, Rachel. The impact of corporate taxation on the location
of capital: A review. Economic Analysis and Policy (EAP), 33(2):275–292, September
2003.
Dharmapala, Dhammika. What do we know about base erosion and profit shifting? a review
of the empirical literature. Fiscal Studies, 35(4):421–448, 2014.
Dharmapala, Dhammika and Riedel, Nadine. Earnings shocks and tax-motivated income-
shifting: Evidence from European multinationals. Journal of Public Economics, 97(C):
95–107, 2013.
Di Giovanni, Julian. What drives capital flows? the case of cross-border m&a activity and
financial deepening. Journal of International Economics, 65(1):127–149, January 2005.
Dinc, Serdar I. and Erel, Isil. Economic nationalism in mergers and acquisitions. The Journal
of Finance, 68(6):2471–2514, 2013.
Egger, Peter; Eggert, Wolfgang, and Winner, Hannes. Saving taxes through foreign plant
ownership. Journal of International Economics, 81(1):99 – 108, 2010.
Egger, Peter H.; Merlo, Valeria, and Wamser, Georg. Unobserved tax avoidance and the tax
elasticity of {FDI}. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 108:1 – 18, 2014.
Ellis, Jesse; Moeller, Sara B.; Schlingemann, Frederik P., and Stulz, Rene´ M. Globalization,
governance, and the returns to cross-border acquisitions. Working Paper 16676, National
Bureau of Economic Research, January 2011.
Erel, Isil; Liao, Rose C., and Weisbach, Michael S. Determinants of cross-border mergers
and acquisitions. The Journal of Finance, 67(3):1045–1082, 2012.
Feld, Lars P. and Heckemeyer, Jost H. Fdi and taxation: A meta study. Journal of Economic
Surveys, 25(2):233–272, 04 2011.
29
Ferreira, M.A.; Massa, M., and Matos, P. Shareholders at the gate? institutional investors
and cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Review of Financial Studies, 23(2):601–644,
2010.
Ferrett, Ben. Greenfield investment versus acquisition: alternative models for foreign ex-
pansion. Centre for Research on Globalization and Economic Policy, Research Paper 39,
2005.
Hebous, Shafik; Ruf, Martin, and Weichenrieder, Alfons. The effects of taxation on the
location decision of multinational firms: M&a versus greenfield investments. National Tax
Journal, 64(3):817–38, 2011.
Herger, Nils; Kotsogiannis, Christos, and McCorriston, Steve. Multiple taxes and alternative
forms of fdi: evidence from cross-border acquisitions. International Tax and Public Finance,
23(1):82–113, 2016.
Hijzen, Alexander; Go¨rg, Holger, and Manchin, Miriam. Cross-border mergers and acquisi-
tions and the role of trade costs. European Economic Review, 52(5):849 – 866, 2008.
Huizinga, Harry P. and Voget, Johannes. International taxation and the direction and volume
of cross-border m&as. Journal of Finance, 64(3):1217–1249, 06 2009.
Liberini, Federica. Corporate taxes and the growth of the firm. The Warwick Economics
Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1-42, University of Warwick, 2014, 2014.
Mayer, Thierry and Zignago, Soledad. Notes on cepii’s distances measures: the geodist
database. MPRA Paper 26469, University Library of Munich, Germany, December 2011.
Neary, J. Peter. Cross-border mergers as instruments of comparative advantage. Review of
Economic Studies, 74(4):1229–1257, October 2007.
Neary, J. Peter. Trade costs and foreign direct investment. International Review of Economics
& Finance, 18(2):207–218, March 2009.
30
Nocke, Volker and Yeaple, Stephen. Cross-border mergers and acquisitions vs. greenfield for-
eign direct investment: The role of firm heterogeneity. Journal of International Economics,
72(2):336–365, July 2007.
Nocke, Volker and Yeaple, Stephen. An assignment theory of foreign direct investment. The
Review of Economic Studies, 75(2):529–557, 2008.
Norback, Pehr-Johan and Persson, Lars. Investment liberalization – why a restrictive cross-
border merger policy can be counterproductive. Journal of International Economics, 72
(2):366–380, July 2007.
Porta, Rafael La; de Silanes, Florencio Lopez, and Shleifer, Andrei. The economic conse-
quences of legal origins. Journal of Economic Literature, 46(2):285–332, June 2008.
Raff, Horst; Ryan, Michael, and Sta¨hler, Frank. The choice of market entry mode: Greenfield
investment, m&a and joint venture. International Review of Economics & Finance, 18(1):
3 – 10, 2009.
Rossi, Stefano and Volpin, Paolo. Cross-country determinants of mergers and acquisitions.
Journal of Financial Economics, 74(2):277–304, 2004.
Shleifer, Andrei and Vishny, Robert W. Liquidation values and debt capacity: A market
equilibrium approach. Journal of Finance, 47(4):1343–66, September 1992.
Shleifer, Andrei and Vishny, Robert W. Stock market driven acquisitions. Journal of Finan-
cial Economics, 70(3):295–311, December 2003.
Sta¨hler, Frank. Partial ownership and cross-border mergers. Journal of Economics, 111(3):
209–237, 2014.
Train, Kenneth E. Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation. Cambridge Books. Cambridge
University Press, December 2009.
31
Voget, Johannes. Relocation of headquarters and international taxation. Journal of Public
Economics, 95(9-10):1067–1081, October 2011.
32
Tables and Figures
Table 1: Characteristics of Parent Companies
Companies
Number %
Total 2,623
Multinational 1,106 42.2
Domestic 1,127 43
Standalone 390 14.9
Expanding only in one year 2,132 81.3
Expanding in two years 400 15.2
Expanding in three years 91 3.5
Expanding to a New Location 1,085 41.4
Expanding to a Old Location 1,538 58.6
Making only one expansion 2,282 87
Making two expansions 255 9.7
Making more than two expansions 86 3.3
Domestic Expansions 1,806 58.3
Cross-border Expansions 817 41.7
The 2,623 companies observed in our sample made at least one acquisition between the end of 2005
and the end of 2008. Companies are categorised as Multinational, Domestic or Standalone based on
the information in the base year 2005. A Parent is defined “standalone” when it does not own any
subsidiaries; “domestic” when it only owns subsidiaries in the same country; and “multinational” when
it owns at least one subsidiary incorporated in a country different from its own. “Domestic Expansion”
refers to acquisitions where the new location corresponds to the Parent Country”
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Table 2: Geographic Distribution of Parent Companies
Countries with 10 or more Parents Countries with less than 10 Parents
[1] [2] [3] [4] [1] [2] [3] [4]
United Kingdom 674 192 224 573 Mexico 7 2 6 7
United States 261 83 75 241 Iceland 7 5 3 6
France 205 117 71 170 Colombia 6 2 3 6
Sweden 195 110 68 156 Ukraine 5 0 4 5
Germany 124 81 51 102 Turkey 4 3 3 4
Russia 120 3 56 116 Romania 2 0 2 2
Spain 115 41 44 102 Peru 2 0 1 2
Netherlands 109 85 48 88 New Zealand 2 0 2 2
Canada 93 40 69 83 Kuwait 2 1 2 1
Italy 77 44 31 70 Kazakhstan 2 1 2 2
Finland 69 37 28 57 Hungary 2 2 2 2
Belgium 64 44 25 54 Venezuela 1 1 0 1
Denmark 61 28 31 52 Slovakia 1 0 1 1
Norway 53 14 25 47 Morocco 1 1 1 1
India 52 21 47 45 Luxembourg 1 1 1 0
Switzerland 52 45 23 39 Lithuania 1 1 1 1
Australia 50 21 40 44 Jamaica 1 0 1 1
South Korea 45 9 29 45 Hong Kong 1 1 1 0
Poland 21 1 10 21 Estonia 1 1 1 1
Greece 20 6 6 19 Cyprus 1 1 1 1
Austria 19 13 8 18
Ireland 19 10 5 19
Japan 19 18 6 19
South Africa 16 5 8 16
Brazil 15 5 6 15
Portugal 15 6 5 15
Singapore 10 4 8 10
Total 2,573 1,083 1,047 2,236 Total 50 23 38 46
The table reports the geographic distribution of the observed 2,623 parent companies. The left panel
reports statistics for the “main” countries, as in countries where 10 or more parent firms are located.
The location of a parent company corresponds to the original incorporation country, as extracted from
the BvD database. Statistics are reported for different subsamples: [1] Total sample; [2] Sample of
Multinational Parent Companies only; [3] Sample of Parents expanding in new locations only; [4] Sample
of Parents making one expansion only.
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Table 3: Target Locations chosen in Observed Expansions
Full Sample Parents MakingOne Choice Multinationals
Location of Targets [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Cross Border: 1245 40.81% 695 30.46% 928 64.31%
Austria 16 1.29% 7 1.01% 11 1.19%
Belgium 40 3.21% 27 3.88% 30 3.23%
Brazil 26 2.09% 15 2.16% 22 2.37%
Canada 37 2.97% 13 1.87% 23 2.48%
Switzerland 16 1.29% 6 0.86% 11 1.19%
Denmark 114 9.16% 54 7.77% 83 8.94%
Finland 18 1.45% 10 1.44% 12 1.29%
France 55 4.42% 37 5.32% 48 5.17%
Germany 36 2.89% 18 2.59% 28 3.02%
Ireland 75 6.02% 40 5.76% 57 6.14%
Italy 233 18.71% 141 20.29% 189 20.37%
Netherlands 33 2.65% 15 2.16% 20 2.16%
Norway 38 3.05% 16 2.30% 29 3.13%
Russia 52 4.18% 31 4.46% 36 3.88%
Spain 36 2.89% 21 3.02% 23 2.48%
Sweden 42 3.37% 26 3.74% 35 3.77%
United Kingdom 73 5.86% 49 7.05% 50 5.39%
United States 305 24.50% 169 24.32% 221 23.81%
Domestic: 1806 59.19% 1587 69.54% 515 35.69%
Australia 18 1.00% 18 1.13% 5 0.97%
Austria 8 0.44% 8 0.50% 4 0.78%
Belgium 34 1.88% 31 1.95% 16 3.11%
Brazil 11 0.61% 11 0.69% 2 0.39%
Canada 62 3.43% 53 3.34% 20 3.88%
Colombia 6 0.33% 6 0.38% 2 0.39%
Denmark 30 1.66% 24 1.51% 7 1.36%
Finland 43 2.38% 37 2.33% 15 2.91%
France 137 7.59% 123 7.75% 54 10.49%
Germany 81 4.49% 67 4.22% 46 8.93%
Continued on next page
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Table 3 – continued from previous page
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Greece 17 0.94% 17 1.07% 4 0.78%
India 13 0.72% 13 0.82% 3 0.58%
Ireland 7 0.39% 7 0.44% 2 0.39%
Italy 53 2.93% 48 3.02% 27 5.24%
Japan 7 0.39% 7 0.44% 6 1.17%
Mexico 1 0.06% 1 0.06% 0 0.00%
Netherlands 45 2.49% 34 2.14% 25 4.85%
Norway 32 1.77% 27 1.70% 6 1.17%
Peru 2 0.11% 2 0.13% 0 0.00%
Poland 20 1.11% 20 1.26% 1 0.19%
Portugal 9 0.50% 9 0.57% 3 0.58%
Romania 2 0.11% 2 0.13% 0 0.00%
Russia 117 6.48% 113 7.12% 2 0.39%
Singapore 6 0.33% 6 0.38% 2 0.39%
South Africa 7 0.39% 7 0.44% 0 0.00%
South Korea 37 2.05% 37 2.33% 5 0.97%
Spain 93 5.15% 84 5.29% 22 4.27%
Sweden 121 6.70% 98 6.18% 55 10.68%
Switzerland 14 0.78% 12 0.76% 10 1.94%
Ukraine 3 0.17% 3 0.19% 0 0.00%
United Kingdom 554 30.68% 460 28.99% 126 24.47%
United States 216 11.96% 202 12.73% 45 8.74%
Total 3051 2282 1443
This table lists the countries chosen as acquisition locations during the sample period end of 2005 to
end of 2008: for the full sample (columns [1] and [2]); for the sample of companies making only one
choice (columns [3] and [4]); for the sample of multinational companies (column [5] and [6]). The
information is split according to whether the acquisition was domestic (Dom) or cross-border (CB).
The totals report the number of expansions. The percentages are calculated for the chosen category.
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Table 5: Random Parameter Logit Model Estimation Results
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Basic
Specifica-
tion
Multino-
mial
Logit
Basic
Specifica-
tion RP
Logit
”Large”
= 4 or
more sub-
sidiaries
in 2005
Alternative
is a New
Location
choice
Parent vs
Host
Country
Taxes
Effective
Averate
Tax Rate
Statutory
Tax Rate
+ Al-
lowances
Interaction of host-country Statutory Tax Rate (τj) for Cross Border expansions:
Intercept -3.886 -12.349** -11.283** -8.025** -13.554*** -9.454*
(3.064) (4.857) (4.817) (4.052) (4.862) (5.156)
MNE 0.598 5.078** 7.187** 7.550*** 5.106**
(1.132) (2.412) (2.95) (2.553) (2.424)
large MNE -4.054**
(2.064)
large non-MNE -4.113
(2.802)
MNE & Choice is a New-Location 2.403
(1.758)
MNE & Choice is a Old-Location 5.913***
(1.791)
Interaction of (τh − τj) for Cross Border Expansion:
MNE & Credit System when (τh > τj) 7.405***
(2.793)
non-MNE & Credit System when (τh > τj) -3.810
(4.134)
Interaction of Host Country Effective Average Tax Rate (EATR) for Cross Border expansions:
Intercept -10.672**
(5.344)
MNE 5.217**
(2.34)
Interaction of Host Country Tax Allowaces for Cross Border expansions:
Intercept -4.216
(3.257)
MNE -2.214
(1.947)
Interaction of host-country Statutory Tax Rate (τh) for Domestic expansions:
Intercept -3.136 -5.78 -4.951 -5.494* -7.634** -8.688**
(2.388) (3.693) (3.726) (2.936) (3.800) (4.223)
MNE -5.470*** -5.687*** -2.762 -3.970*** -2.544 -6.296**
(1.221) (1.441) (2.236) (1.306) (1.847) (3.119)
MNE & large -4.502**
(2.085)
non-MNE & large -2.268
(2.832)
Interaction of Host Country Effective Average Tax Rate (EATR) for Domestic expansions:
Intercept -7.706**
(3.613)
MNE -6.132***
(1.539)
Continued on next page
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Table 5 – continued from previous page
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Interaction of Host Country Tax Allowaces for Domestic expansions:
Intercept 10.225***
(2.919)
MNE -2.013
(2.208)
Control Variables:
log GDP (constant 2000 USD) 0.569*** 1.045*** 1.028*** 0.7330*** 1.054*** 1.155*** 1.432***
(0.105) (0.257) (0.260) (0.187) (0.265) (.27) (.318)
GDP growth -0.042 -0.066 -0.064 -0.049 -0.068 -0.061 -0.06
(0.039) (0.051) (0.051) (0.044) (0.051) (.049) (.053)
Cost of business start-ups as % of GNI -0.036*** -0.060*** -0.060*** -0.043*** -0.060*** -0.058*** -0.064***
(0.006) (0.014) (0.014) (0.010) (0.014) (.013) (.015)
Business extent of disclosure index -0.04 -0.010* -0.102* -0.062 -0.100* -0.117** -0.151**
(0.03) (0.055) (0.055) (0.040) (0.054) (.055) (.061)
Unemployment as a % of labour force 0.060** 0.065* 0.064* 0.063** 0.058 0.067* 0.071*
(0.024) (0.037) (0.037) (0.029) (0.037) (.035) (.039)
Average Corruption Score (1996− 2000) -0.195 -0.368 -0.403 -0.259 -0.428 -0.357 -0.242
(0.146) (0.251) (0.252) (0.181) (0.262) (.244) (.274)
Market capitalization to GDP (1999− 2003) 0.101 0.18 0.164 0.147 0.208 -0.026 -0.251
(0.166) (0.279) (0.278) (0.257) (0.279) (.269) (.314)
No. Domestic Firms (1999− 2003) 0.067 0.074 0.086 0.089 0.115 0.168 0.222
(0.104) (0.176) (0.176) (0.127) (0.175) (.169) (.193)
Private credit to GDP (1999− 2003) -1.087*** -1.780*** -1.754*** -1.286*** -1.697*** -1.794*** -2.056***
(0.254) (0.496) (0.497) (0.362) (0.493) (.482) (.537)
Control Variables specific to CB expansions:
Contiguity of Host and Target Country 0.492*** 0.455*** 0.454*** 0.403** 0.388** 0.476*** 0.406**
(0.16) (0.172) (0.172) (0.168) (0.175) (.172) (.182)
Common Language 0.342** 0.315* 0.324* 0.318* 0.335* 0.294 0.338*
(0.17) (0.184) ) (0.184) (0.178) (0.183 (.186) (.19)
Distance btw capitals of Host and Target -0.281*** -0.424*** -0.404*** -0.282*** -0.451 -0.400*** -0.445***
(0.069) (0.085) (0.085) (0.084) (0.087) (.081) (.089)
Common Legal System 0.798*** 0.800*** 0.802*** 0.726*** 0.801*** 0.814*** 0.803***
(0.123) (0.127) (0.127) (0.127) (0.127) (.131) (.134)
Standard Deviation of the RP on tax (σ) 7.620*** 7.547*** 3.650* 7.558*** 7.720*** 8.045***
(2.238) (2.288) (1.927) (2.235) (2.262) (2.169)
Maximised Log Likelihood -2608.1 -2602.28 -2597.17 -2563.22 -2596.61 -2590.81 -2571.47
The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the parent company chooses a particular location among a set of alter-
natives. The choice set varies across companies. Some have 18 and some have 19 alternatives, depending on whether
the domestic acquisition is part of the choice set or not. All specifications are random parameter logit (RPL) except
column [1] which gives the results from a simple multinomial logit model. The RPL model allows the effect of host
country tax variable (τj) to be random across companies. The RPL model was maximised using simulated maximum
likelihood with 50 Halton random draws. All models allow intercepts and parent country statutory tax rate (τi) effects to
vary with the alternatives. Sample size corresponds to the 2,282 parents that made only one location choice during the
period 2005-2008. “MNE” is a binary indicator for multinational enterprises as defined in the base year 2005. “Credit
System” is an indicator for parent countries which operate a credit system. The intercept provides effects for the
reference case, which varies across columns. Standard errors are in parentheses. The asterisks indicate significance:
*** ( 1%), ** (5%), * (10% ).
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Table 6: Random Parameter Logit Model - Robustness Checks
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Basic
Specification RP
Logit
Like [1], without
control variables
Like [1], including
multi-country
acquisitions
Like [1], only
main parent
countries
(Tab. 5, Col. [2])
Interaction of host-country statutory tax rate (τj) for Cross Border expansions:
Intercept -12.349** -13.917** -10.947** -12.261**
(4.857) (6.479) (4.487) (4.912)
MNE 5.078** 6.474** 7.463*** 4.994**
(2.412) (3.207) (2.328) (2.424)
Interaction of host-country statutory tax rate (τh) for Domestic expansions:
Intercept -5.78 5.345 -7.786** -6.8228*
(3.693) (3.595) (3.441) (3.748)
MNE -5.687*** -5.880*** -4.693*** -5.650***
(1.441) (1.551) (1.117) (1.438)
Control Variables:
log GDP (constant 2000 USD) 1.045*** 1.098*** 1.102***
(0.257) (0.242) (0.271)
GDP growth -0.066 -0.063 -0.07
(0.051) (0.043) (0.050)
Cost of business start-ups as % of GNI -0.060*** -0.056*** -0.058***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
Business extent of disclosure index -0.010* -0.110** -0.111**
(0.055) (0.051) (0.056)
Unemployment as a % of labour force 0.065* 0.070** 0.065*
(0.037) (0.035) (0.037)
Average Corruption Score (1996-2000) -0.368 -0.383* -0.309
(0.251) (0.231) (0.245)
Market capitalization to GDP (1999-2003) 0.18 -0.246 0.139
(0.279) (0.256) (0.277)
No. Domestic Firms (1999-2003) 0.074 0.15 0.111
(0.176) (0.167) (0.175)
Private credit to GDP (1999-2003) -1.780*** -1.444*** -1.859***
(0.496) (0.455) (0.503)
Continued on next page
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Table 6 – continued from previous page
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Control Variables specific to CB expansions:
Contiguity of Host and Target Country 0.455*** 0.378*** 0.459***
(0.172) (0.131) (0.172)
Common Language 0.315* 0.250* 0.316*
(0.184) (0.141) (0.184)
Distance btw capitals of Host -0.424*** -0.424*** -0.419***
and Target Country (0.085) (0.064) (0.086)
Common Legal System 0.800*** 0.694*** 0.797***
(0.127) (0.100) (0.127)
Standard Deviation of the RP on tax (σ) 7.620*** 8.806** 8.803*** 7.504***
(2.238) (3.475) (2.173) (2.302)
Maximised Log Likelihood -2,602.28 -2,796.12 -4,423.24 -2,600.49
Number of Companies 2,282 2,282 3,051 2,236
The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the parent company chooses a particular location among a set of al-
ternatives. The choice set is unchanged w.r.t. Table 5. All specifications are random parameter logit. The RPL
model allows the effect of host country tax variable to be random across companies. The RPL model was maximised
using simulated maximum likelihood with 50 Halton random draws. In addition to the coefficients reported, all models
allow intercepts and parent country statutory tax rate effects to vary with the alternatives. Column [1] reports the
preferred model from Table 5 (Column [2]). Column [2] re-estimate this model without geographical controls. Column
[3] includes the companies making acquisitions in more than one country during the sample period end of 2005 to end
of 2008 (for a total of 3,051 expansions). Column [4] includes only acquisitions made by those parents incorporated
in countries where we observe at least other 9 parent firms, as indicated in Table 2 (for a total of 2,276 expansions).
The intercept provides effects for the reference case, which varies across columns. Standard errors are in parentheses.
The asterisks indicate significance: *** ( 1%), ** (5%), * (10% ).
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Appendices
A Marginal Effects and Elasticities in Multinomial and Mixed (Random Pa-
rameter) Logit Models
The model specification for the latent surplus derived from a particular choice of a target
company in countryj(= 1, . . . , J) by acquirer i is given by
Sij = β
′
jzi + γxj + αi + εij (A.1)
where zi is a vector of choice invariant (company) characteristics. For ease of exposi-
tion, we assume that there is only one alternative specific variable x, say the target country
specific tax rate. The company is assumed to make the choice which gives the largest surplus.
Multinomial Logit Model
Marginal Effect of a change in location j specific variable xj (the target country j’ s tax rate),
on the probability of a particular choice of a target company in the same country j is
∂pij
∂xj
=
∂
∂xj
[
exp{β ′jzi + γxj}∑J
k=1 exp{β ′kzi + γxk}
]
= pij(1− pij)γ (A.2)
where,
pij ≡ Prob(j is chosen ) =
exp{β ′jzi + γxj}∑J
k=1 exp{β ′kzi + γxk}
(A.3)
The corresponding elasticity is given by
∂ log pij
∂ log xj
= (1− pij)xjγ (A.4)
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Similarly, it is easy to show that the cross marginal effect with respect to another location
m’ s tax rate is
∂pij
∂xm
=
∂
∂xm
[
exp{β ′jzi + γxm}∑J
k=1 exp{β ′kzi + γxk}
]
= −pijpimγ (A.5)
And the corresponding elasticity is given by
∂ log pij
∂ log xm
= −pimxmγ (A.6)
Note, the elasticity in (A.6) does not depend on j.
We see from the above that a change in the tax rate at a particular target location will have
an effect on not just the probability of choosing that location but the probability of choosing
all other locations too.
Random Parameter Logit (RPL) or Mixed Logit Model
Instead of assuming that γ is fixed in (A.1), we now assume that every company in our
sample has its own γ and write this as
γi = γ
′wi + σui where ui ∼ iid N(0, 1) (A.7)
i.e. γi ∼ iid N(γ′wi, σ2). This model collapses to the earlier one when σ = 0.
Substituting (A.7) into (A.1), we get
Sij = β
′
jzi + (γ
′wi + σui)xj + (σxjui + εij) (A.8)
Estimation of company specific effect γi
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ui in (A.8) is an unobserved company specific random variable. Then, by Bayes theorem,
the density of ui given data
f(ui|data) = f(ui|choices) = f(choices|ui)f(ui)
f(choices)
Thus,
E(ui|choices) =
∫
uf(u|choices)du =
∫
uf(choices|u)f(u)du
f(choices)
(A.9)
f(choices|u) is the conditional likelihood which appears in the likelihood function prior
to marginalisation, and f(choices) is the marginal likelihood which are obtained during the
maximisation. f(u) is the standard normal density by assumption in our model. The esti-
mated E(ui|choices) is known as the Bayesian shrinkage estimator.
Marginal effects and Elasticities
The conditional marginal effects and elasticities in this model will be given by equations
(A.2)-(A.6). In order to obtain the unconditional marginal effects and elasticities, one has
to marginalise this with respect to the distribution of the coefficients (i.e the random error u
here), which again requires simulations to approximate the integral as discussed above.
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B Variable Source
Variable Description Source
Tax Variables:
Statutory Tax Rate Main statutory tax rate, including typ-
ical local taxes
CBT database
Effective Average Tax Rate Effective average tax rate, using the
Devereux-Griffith (2003) method
CBT database
Allowance The present value of tax allowances per-
mitted per unit of investment
CBT database
Economic Indicators:
ln(GDP) ln of GDP (originally measured in con-
stant 2000 USD)
WDI, 2011
GDP growth GDP growth (annual %) WDI, 2011
Cost Bus. Start-up Cost of business start-up procedures (%
of GNI per capita)
WDI, 2011
Bus. Discl. Index Business extent of disclosure index
(0=less disclosure to 10=more disclo-
sure)
WDI, 2011
Unempl. Total Unemployment (% of total labor
force)
WDI, 2011
Distance Variables:
Contiguity Dummy for Contiguity (=1 parent
country and alternative location share
borders)
GeoDist, 2011
Common Language Dummy for Common Language (=1
parent country and location have same
official or primary language)
GeoDist, 2011
Distance btw Capitals Simple distance between capitals (mea-
sured in km)
GeoDist, 2011
Common Legal Syst. Dummy for Legal System (=1 if parent
country and location have same Legal
System)
La Porta, 2008
Institutional Variables:
Corruption Score Average corruption score over the pe-
riod 1996-2000
WDI, 2011
Mkt Capit. To GDP Ratio of market capitalisation to GDP,
av. 1999-2003
WDI, 2011
Private Credit to GDP Private credit to GDP, av. 1999-2003 WDI, 2011
ln(No. Dom. Firms) ln(No. Domestic Firms pc), av. 1999-
2003
WDI, 2011
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